Hardening PicoPaaS against machine-speed attacks

A security roundup: web login for admin actions, per-key request budgets, rule-based security alerts for admins, no API keys in Kaisen chats, API docs behind a login, an optional recovery key, and automatic route checks in CI.

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This month the FBI and Google's Threat Intelligence Group warned about ARTEX, an AI-driven attack framework that works at machine speed. It goes after admin interfaces with stolen credentials, partner portals and legacy services. Sources: Google Cloud blog and The Record. We reviewed PicoPaaS against the techniques described and shipped the following over the last few days.

Admin actions need a web login

Approving, suspending and promoting users, password resets, platform settings, the banner, database servers and platform hostnames now refuse API keys. A leaked admin key can no longer be used to take over accounts. Operational calls the CLI uses, such as backup restore and app suspend, still work with a key.

API keys have a request budget

Each key gets 120 requests a minute and 3,000 an hour. Beyond that you get HTTP 429 with a Retry-After header. Browser sessions are not counted, and normal CLI use is far below the limit. Each user can have up to 25 active keys.

Security alerts for admins

Rule-based checks run every five minutes and look for admin action bursts, recovery-key use, a new key followed by a burst of activity, login pressure, floods of invalid keys, Kaisen spend spikes and mass account changes. Alerts appear on the new Admin, Security alerts tab, and Health shows a count. There is no AI involved and no extra cost. Acknowledge an alert once you have dealt with it.

Kaisen won't take API keys in the chat

Briefs, change requests and answers that contain an Anthropic, OpenAI-style, PicoPaaS or other provider key are refused before anything is stored or sent to the model. That includes keys that are base64 or otherwise encoded. Use Build secrets instead.

API docs behind a login

/docs, /redoc and /openapi.json now need a login, and admin routes never appear in the published schema. To be honest about it, this is hygiene and not a security boundary: the project's source is public. The real protection is the authorization checks on every route.

Optional root management key for self-hosters

If you run your own PicoPaaS you can set ROOT_MANAGEMENT_KEY (at least 32 characters) as a break-glass way to reset a locked-out administrator's password over HTTPS. It is off by default and off on picopaas.xyz. See the Admin Guide, "Admins and recovery".

Testing

Every route in the app is now checked automatically in CI: no new unauthenticated route, no admin write that accepts a key, no unknown fields, no secrets echoed back, and no different answer for someone else's object than for a missing one. We also ran a pentest round and a coverage pass. The suite is now about 4,400 tests at 96% coverage.